Security Challenges in Virtualized Environments

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Confidence 2008,
Krakow, Poland, May 15th, 2008

1 Virtualization-based **MALWARE**

2 Using Virtual Machines for **ISOLATION**

3 **NESTED** virtualization

Virtualization-based MALWARE

Hardware

OS

Hardware

Blue Pill

OS

AMD-V
Intel VT-x

Blue Pill Characteristics

NO HOOKS! → Cannot be detected using any integrity scanner

On the fly installation → No boot/BIOS/etc modifications necessary

No I/O virtualization → Negligible performance impact (your brand new 3D card will still work!)

Blue Pill detection

Blue Pill detection



Detecting a VMM

Detecting virtualization based malware

VMM detection

Direct timing analysis

Guest time virtualization

HPET timers

Blue Chicken

CPU specific behavior

TLB profiling

VMM detection?

- Everything is going to be virtualized!
- Thus the information that "there is a hypervisor in the system"...
- ...would be pretty much useless...

Detecting virtualized malware?

No Hooks!

Search for code

Detect activity
(e.g. network packets)

Heuristics

By Pattern

- Stealth by Design concept
- Covert channels

Nested Page Tables
(hardware SPT)

"Massive" malware

Simple
Obfuscation

Won't work

0day malware

The whole big deal about Blue Pill is:

NO HOOKS in the system!

Blue Pill prevention

Disable virtualization?

How about also disabling your network card so you never got infected from the Internet?

Install a trusted hypervisor first?

Installing trusted hypervisor



Static Root of Trust Measurement

BIOS > MBR > VMM
e.g. MS Bitlocker

Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement

SENTER (Intel TXT)
SKINIT (AMD SVM)

Trusted vs. Secure?

- SRTM and DRTM only assures that what we load is trusted...
- ...at the moment of loading!
- 3 sec later... it could be exploited and get compromised!

Trusted != Secure

known,
not compromised

no bugs

E.g. #1: The famous DMA problem


Some device
Hardware
I/O: asks the device to setup a DMA transfer
(Trusted) Hypervisor
Read/Write memory access!
Some driver
OS

IOMMU

- Solution to the problem of "DMA attacks"
- Intel calls it: VT-d
- Not much PC hardware supports it yet
  - Expected to change soon
- No THIN HYPERVISORS without IOMMU!

Other problems with VMMs?

Stay tuned...

All in all:

it's not trivial to have a trusted & secure hypervisor...

... but this is the proper way to go!

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Using Virtual Machines for ISOLATION

Originally ISOLATION was supposed to be provided by Operating Systems...

- Separate processes/address spaces,
- User accounts & ACLs...

But in practice current OSes simply fail at providing isolation!

Why OSes fail?

- Kernel bugs!
- Kernel bugs!!
- Kernel bugs!!!
- Bad design, e.g.:
  - XP and “all runs as admin” assumption
  - Vista’s UAC assumes admin rights should be granted to every installer program!

VMMs for the rescue!

trusted & secure hypervisor

Vista
(work projects)

Linux + Firefox
("random"
surfing)

Linux + Firefox
(online banking)

MacOSX
("home", e.g.
pics, music, etc)

Challenges

- Performance
- Why is VMM/hypervisor going to be more secure then OS's kernel?

VMM bugs?

VMM Bugs



Bugs in hypervisors

Bugs in additional infrastructure

E.g. #1: CVE-2007-4496

- VMWare ESX 3.0.1
  - http://www.vmware.com/support/vi3/doc/esx-8258730-patch.html
- Found by Rafal Wojtczuk (McAfee)
- September 2007
- Guest OS can cause memory corruption on the host and *potentially* allow for arbitrary code execution on the host

E.g. #2: CVE-2007-0948

- Microsoft Virtual Server 2005 R2
  - http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms07-049.mspx
- Found by Rafal Wojtczuk (McAfee)
- August 2007
- Heap-based buffer overflow allows guest OS to execute arbitrary code on the host OS

E.g. #3: CVE-2007-4993

- Xen 3.0.3
  - http://bugzilla.xensource.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=1068
- Found by Joris van Rantwijk
- September 2007
- By crafting a grub.conf file, the root user in a guest domain can trigger execution of arbitrary Python code in domain 0.

E.g. #4: Various Bugs

- Paper by Tavis Ormandy (Google)
  - http://taviso.decsystem.org/virtsec.pdf
- April 2007
  - Disclosed bugs in VMWare, XEN, Bochs, Virtual PC, Prallels
  - A simple fuzzers for:
    - Instruction parsing by VMMs
    - I/O device emulation by VMMs

As you see, current VMMs are far from being flawless...

To make VMMs more secure we need to keep them ultra-thin and small!

Phoenix HyperSpace


Windows®
AppSpace™
ManageSpace™
HyperCore™
SecureCore BIOS

Search

02:39 pm

http://maps.google.com/

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Google Maps

e.g., "10 market st, san francisco" or "hotels near lax"

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Search Results | My Maps

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Welcome to Google Maps

You can drag the map with your mouse, and double-click to zoom. Take a tour »

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kansas city
10 market st, san francisco

Find businesses, e.g.
hotels near lax
pizza

Get directions, e.g.
jfk to 350 5th ave, new york
seattle to 98109

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- Add Google Maps to your website: Learn more »
- Get free local info. 800-GOOG-411: Learn more »



Done

HyperCore:
the type I hypervisor used for HyperSpace


Hardware
HyperCore
Vista (HVM)
AppSpace #1
(DomU PV)
AppSpace #2
(DomU PV)
Device
Model
Virtualizer/
Drivers
(DomU)
ManageSpace
(Dom0 PV)

The HyperCore

- Targets desktop/laptop systems
- Guest OS execute at near-native performance (including fancy graphics)
- Support for full ACPI (Power Management)
- Integrity: loaded via SecureCore BIOS (Static Root of Trust Measurement)
- Very thin - easy to audit!

Speeding things up

- Pass through for most devices
- SPT: 1-1 mapping for most pages for the Primary OS

Power Management

- ACPI tables exposed to the Primary OS, so that the overall power performance is optimized
- Efficient intercepts for power management control

Integrity

- Static RTM via Phoenix's SecureCore BIOS
- Dynamic RTM via Intel's TXT/AMD's SKINIT
- SMM-based watchdog for HyperCore code


Windows®
AppSpace™
ManageSpace™
HyperCore™
SecureCore BIOS

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NESTED virtualization

What if a user wants to run e.g. Virtual PC here?



Hypervisor (Primary)

VM_1

VM_2 (Nested Hypervisor)

VM_3

VM_4

VM_{21}

VM_{22}

VM_{221}

VM_{222}

Idea of how to handle this situation...


Hypervisor
VM1
VM2
VM3
VM21
VM22
VM221
VM222
Hypervisor
VM1
VM2
VM21
VM22
VM221
VM222
VM3

Now, lets look at the actual details :)

Let's start with AMD-V...

WARNING!!!

deep technical content follows

(next 14 slides)

don't worry if you get lost!


VMCB0
VMCB0
VMCB0
VMRUN
VMRUN
RDMSR


VMCB0
VMRUN
VMCB1
VMRUN
?


VMCB0
VMCB0
VMCB1'
VMRUN
VMRUN
VMCB1
VMRUN
RDMSR
?


VMCB1'
VMRUN
VMCB1
VMRUN
VMCB1'
VMCB0
VMRUN
VMCB1
RAX
RDMSR

Looks convincing but we also need to take care about some technical details, that are not trivial...


VMCB0
VMCB0
VMCB0
VMRUN
VMRUN
GIF=0
RDMSR
GIF=1
GIF=1

Hypervisor

Nested Hypervisor

Nested Guest



- Hypervisors expect to have GIF=1 when VMEXIT occurs...
  - They might not be prepared to handle interrupts just after VMEXIT from guests!
- ... but when we resume the nested hypervisor CPU sets GIF=1, because we do this via VMRUN, not VMEXIT...

Getting around the "GIF Problem"

- We need to "emulate" that GIF is 0 for the nested hypervisor
- We stop this emulation when:
  - The nested hypervisor executes STGI
  - The nested hypervisor executes VMRUN
- How do we emulate it?

GIF0 emulation

- $VMCB_1$'.V_INTR_MASKING = 1
- Host's RFLAGS.IF = 0
- Intercept NMI, SMI, INIT, #DB and held (i.e. record and reinject) or discard until we stop the emulation

Additional details

- Need to also intercept VMLOAD/VMSAVE
- Need to virtualize VM_HSAVE_PA
- ASID conflicts

Hypervisor: ASID = 0

Nested Hypervisor: ASID = 1
(but thinks that has ASID = 0)

Conflicting ASIDs!

Nested Guest: ASID = 1
(assigned by the nested hypervisor)

But we can always reassign the ASID in the VMCB "prim" that we use to run the nested guest.

Performance Impact

- One additional #VMEXIT on every #VMEXIT that would occur in a non-nested scenario
- One additional #VMEXIT when the nested hypervisor executes: STGI, CLGI, VMLOAD, VMSAVE
- Lots of space for optimization though

Lost already? ;)

Don’t worry! The main message is...

This can be done!

&

It works!

Administrator: Command Prompt

```
C:\tmp\nbp-0.30>\tools\w2k_load.exe bin\amd64\newbp.sys

// w2k_load.exe
// SBS Windows 2000 Driver Loader V1.00
// 08-27-2000 Sven B. Schreiber
// sbs@orgon.com

Loading "bin\amd64\newbp.sys" ... OK

C:\tmp\nbp-0.30>\tmp\bpknock.exe 0xbabecafe
knock answer: 0x69696969

C:\tmp\nbp-0.30>"\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Virtual PC\Virtual PC.exe"

C:\tmp\nbp-0.30>\tmp\bpknock.exe 0xbabecafe
knock answer: 0x69696969

C:\tmp\nbp-0.30>
```

Virtual PC Console

File Action Help

Linux install
Not running

Vista
Not running

Windows XP
Running

New...
Settings
Remove
Close...

Windows XP - Microsoft Virtual PC 2007

Action Edit CD Floppy Help

Command Prompt

```
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.

C:\Documents and Settings\useruser>cd \tmp

C:\tmp>bpknock.exe 0xbabecfe
knock answer: 0

C:\tmp>bpknock.exe 0xbabecafe
knock answer: 0x69696969

C:\tmp>_
```

Administrator: Co... | Windows Server 20... | DebugView on \\T... | Virtual PC Console | Windows XP - Micr... | XP inside VPC insid... | 1:56 PM

http://bluepillproject.org

Intel VT-x

Nested virtualization on VT-x

- No GIF bit - no need to emulate "GIF0" for the nested hypervisor :)
- No Tagged TLB - No ASID conflicts :)
- However:
  - VMX instructions can take memory operands - need to use complex operand parser
  - No tagged TLB - potentially bigger performance impact

Nested VT-x: Status

- We have that working!
- The VT-x nesting code cannot be published though :(

Who else does Nested (hardware-based) Virtualization?

IBM z/VM hypervisor on IBM System z™ mainframe

"Running z/VM in a virtual machine (that is, z/VM as a guest of z/VM, also known as "second-level" z/VM) is functionally supported but is intended only for testing purposes for the second-level z/VM system and its guests (called "third-level" guests)."

-- http://www.vm.ibm.com/pubs/hcsf8b22.pdf

IBM System z10, source: ibm.com

Confusion

- AMD Nested Page Tables != Nested Virtualization!
- NPT is a hardware alternative to Shadow Page Tables (a good thing, BTW)
- NPT is also called: Rapid Virtualization Indexing

Nested Virtualization: Security Implications


hypervisor
MBR/
BIOS
VM1
VM1
VM1
Management
Domain


Blue Pill :)
Type I hypervisor
MBR/
BIOS
VM
VM
VM
Management
Domain

Solution: ensure hypervisor integrity via SRTM or DRTM



SRTM/DRTM do not protect the already loaded hypervisor, from being exploited if it is buggy!

Keep hypervisors very slim!

Do not put drivers there!

Nested Virtualization: Useful Applications

Remember Phoenix's HyperCore?

What if a user wants to run e.g. Virtual PC here?



Phoenix Technologies has supported the research on nested hypervisors since Fall 2007

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Summary

- Virtualization technology could be used to improve security on desktop systems
- However there are non-trivial challenges in making this all working well...
- Virtualization is cool ;)

New stuff coming soon...

Summer 2008 in Las Vegas...

Invisible Things Lab

http://invisiblethingslab.com

Thank you!